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Abstract 
The debate over the hijab has become an arena of fervent discussion in Europe. The re-
cent political developments have opened a discussion on the relationship between a 
“secularized” West and an Islamic world. At the heart of this debate is the juridical reg-
ulation of women’s body and whether a simple piece of cloth such as the veil should be 
allowed or prohibited. This article takes into consideration two leading cases decided at 
the European Court of Human Rights over the practice of veiling which rely on the as-
sumption that the headscarf is incompatible with western democratic values because 
irreconcilable with the principle of gender equality. I argue that the hijab cannot be seen 
as an expression of women’s oppression, as the concept of freedom and agency changes 
in different historical and cultural contexts: thus, what these decisions reveal is that the 
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universalism of the Western/liberal concept of freedom and agency has been the main 
domain through which to read women’s oppression and their possibility of agency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The image of a silent Muslim woman under the shroud of a burqa1 has been one of the 
most recurrent during the ongoing Western “war for democracy”. The veil, which since 
the colonial  period has been a powerful symbol associated with the “backwardness” of 
Muslim culture, is still one of the most debated issues when thinking about Islam, ter-
rorism, and Muslim women’s freedom. However, while the meaning of the veil as a 
“sign of" Muslim women’s oppression has remained unchanged in the last two centuries 
of Western culture, in Muslim majority societies veiling is an immanent and performa-
tive ever-changing phenomenon which takes different meanings, colors and forms in 
different cultural and historical contexts (Ahmed 1992; Sedgwick 2006; Mernissi 1991; 
El Guindi 1999; Bodman and Tohidi 1998). 
As I shall argue, it is exactly the operation of collapsing differences among Muslim 
women through the reading of veiling as a monolithic symbol of something intrinsically 
‘other’ that nowadays reproduces neo-colonial thought (Davary 2009). 
This is clear when analyzing legal decisions by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) over the practice of veiling, which rely on the assumption that the practice is 
irreconcilable with the principle of gender equality and is thus ‘incompatible with west-
ern/secular/liberal democratic values’. I will take into consideration two leading cases 
decided at the ECtHR: Sahin v. Turkey, and Dahlab v. Switzerland2. Although diverse 
European national courts have disclosed different concepts of secularism, subject’s au-
                                                                
1 A loose outer garment that covers women’s head and face. 
2 See Sahin v. Turkey and Dahlav v Switzerland. 
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tonomy and women’s freedom in dealing with the matter3, I consider these cases to ex-
emplify the paradoxes of liberal/Western thought concerning when dealing with the 
matter of women and religious freedom. Reading Wendy Brown (2001) on the need to 
cast doubt on the normative limits of liberal political discourse, this article aims to chal-
lenge the fixed symbology that ECtHR’s judges have attached to the practice of veiling. 
Drawing on Mahmood, who spent four years working with the women of the ‘piety 
movement’ in Egypt, I will point out that it is possible to conceive an alternative under-
standing of norms than the liberal one, as different contexts produce different subjectivi-
ties: this does not mean to ‘Orientalize’ Muslim women in a binary structure of ‘oppres-
sion/liberation’, but tries to understand the lives of women, including the practice of 
veiling, in a non-liberal framework. Since the practice of veiling includes significant 
variations depending on cultural, historical and political contexts, my focus will not be 
on whether Muslim women freely choose to veil, rather I want to use the practice of 
veiling as a benchmark to develop different concepts of agency, freedom and subject 
formation. 
I argue that by defining veiling as a fixed ‘symbol of’ something intrinsically other, 
not only do the ECtHR’s decisions reveal the inadequacy of Western/liberal universalist 
discourse over the notion of women’s freedom and agency within non-liberal pluralistic 
contexts, but they also bring private sentiments into the public sphere. In this context, 
the definition of veiling as a static symbol of women’s universal oppression indicates 
that speaking about the practice in Western societies often becomes problematic, «for 
the universalism such terminology seems to endorse denies …[its] cultural variations 
and specificity» (Hirschmann 2009, 171). 
                                                                
3 In France, for instance, the banning of the veil has been framed in the name of state neutrality and public 
order (as the headscarf has been considered a practice that challenges French social cohesion as well as 
secular principles) (Brems 2006). In Germany, eight Länder have passed a law prohibiting the wearing of 
the veil in public institutions in the name of ‘religious pluralism’ and for the ‘protection of the Christian 
traditions’ of the country (Schiffauer 2006): thus, «while in France the notion of secularity has been inter-
preted in terms of a rupture from the Christian past, in Germany it has been regarded as implying a conti-
nuity of the Christian tradition» (Amir-Moazami 2005, 271). In the United Kingdom, where the govern-
ment has taken a more flexible approach to cultural diversity, recent legal controversies in relation to the 
wearing of the veil at work and within educational institutions have re-opened the discussion about multi-
culturalism. Although national European courts have framed the issue of veiling differently, (Muslim) 
women’s body remains at the center of many polemical debates in Europe. 
 
 169 
 
 2. On the dichotomy between the ‘veiled’ and the ‘naked’ body 
 
In the 1960s, western feminists’ struggle for emancipation rendered a simple piece of 
clothing, such as the mini skirt, the symbol of a whole social and cultural change. At 
that time, the mini skirt represented the possibility for women to make choices about 
their body, historically controlled by patriarchal social and political powers. ‘I wear my 
Skirt as I like’ could be a slogan of women struggling for the mini skirt more than forty 
years ago; rather, it is a campaign created in 2015 after the expulsion of young girls 
from schools in France and Belgium because their skirts were considered ‘too long’ and 
thus a ‘provocation, and potential act of protest’4. The decision, made by the respective 
heads of school, was taken after the banning in both countries of religious symbols from 
public schools in the context that the ‘long-skirt’ was considered ‘Muslim clothing’ and 
thus a ‘religious symbol’. This indicates that the juridical regulation of women’s body, 
along with the fundamental dichotomy between the ‘naked-liberated’ body and the 
“covered-constrained” one, remains at the core of many polemical debates, in the past 
as well as nowadays. This obsession is now mirrored in Western legal decisions over 
women’s clothes; whereas the “naked body”, symbolized in the mini skirt, is considered 
a “sign of” women’s liberation associated with their possibility of agency, the ‘long-
skirt’ (along with the hijab) has been regarded as a ‘conspicuous religious symbol’ in-
compatible with Christian/secular/liberal5 values of tolerance and gender equality. It 
seems, therefore, that in the Christian/liberal/secular West, in which the model of ‘liber-
ated’ woman has been ‘naturalized’ and ‘universalized’, the length of women’s skirts 
becomes the measurement of women’s freedom. 
The centrality of women’s body performativity is exemplified in the comparison be-
tween Dahlab and Kokkinakis cases decided at the ECtHR.6 Dahlab was a teacher in a 
primary school in Switzerland. After a period of deep spiritual searching she converted 
to Islam and started to wear the hijab. She wore the veil for four years without disclos-
                                                                
4 See Tharoor (2015). See also Furniere (2015).  
5 I have chosen to use this term because I see a continuation between Christianity and the secular (Kan-
torowicz 1957; Diamantides 2015). 
6 See Dahlav v. Switzerland (supra), and Kokkinakis v. Greece.  
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ing her religious beliefs; during that time there was no complaint from her young stu-
dents or their families. When students asked her why she was wearing long clothing and 
covering her head, she used to answer that it was to keep her ears warm (Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, 456). After four years, an inspector visited the school and reported that 
Dahlab was wearing “Muslim” garments. The Director General of Public Education 
tried to mediate with Dahlab and asked her to remove the veil: when she refused, alleg-
ing her right to wear the headscarf, she was dismissed. She appealed the decision in the 
Swiss Court, which upheld the decision of the School based on a law that explicitly 
prohibits the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. Dahlab appealed at the 
ECtHR which, in line with the Swiss Court, did not find any violation of the claimant’s 
fundamental rights7. The decision was justified based on the principle of necessity, 
which states that the fundamental rights of the Convention can be limited for the protec-
tion of public order and to defend democratic values8: in the case, Dahlab’s veil was 
considered an element of ‘tension’ in the school. Based on ECtHR’s jurisprudence, in 
cases of social tension and conflict, the parties should take measures to reconcile and 
not to prohibit group manifestations. However, instead of trying to reconcile the parties 
based on the principle of plurality9, the Court’s judges presupposed that when the indi-
vidual works in public places s/he has to comply with liberal/secular values and they 
focused on the importance of weighting «the requirements of the protection of the rights 
and liberties of others against the conduct of which the applicant stood accused» 
(Dahlab v. Switzerland, 449): in other words, the woman bearer of rights becomes the 
accused. In fact, instead of weighing the rights of Dahlab to wear the hijab with the 
                                                                
7 See Article 8 – «Right to respect for private and family life», Article 9, «Freedom of thought, con-
science and religion», Article 10 – «Freedom of expression», Article 14 – «The enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground» (‘Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights ; 2016). Notably, this was the first case in which the ECtHR’s judges 
referred to the gender dimension of the act of wearing the veil as a further justification to ban the head-
scarf in public schools. 
8 The key provision in the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms with 
respect to freedom of religion is art. 9. 1 («everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion»). Art. 9. 2: «Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others» (‘European Convention on Human Rights; 2016). 
9 In Kokkinakis v. Greece, para 31 and in Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, para.44, the ECHR clearly 
stated that pluralism is an important feature in a democratic society. 
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rights and freedom of others, the ECtHR presented an (imaginary) undefined ‘other’ in 
need of protection from the “wrongdoing” of Dahlab. 
 The most controversial point of the decision is the accusation of proselytism moved 
against the claimant. In fact, it is not clear which kind of ‘bad influence’ or ‘proselytiz-
ing effects’ Dahlab was exercising on ‘vulnerable children’ since she did not even tell 
them that she had converted to Islam. The weakness of the accusation of proselytism 
moved against the claimant is evident when comparing the case with Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, decided at the ECtHR. In the case, two Jehovah’s Witnesses were charged with 
the criminal offence of proselytizing by the Greek Court after knocking on the door of 
diverse Greek Orthodox priests in order to try to convince them of the truth of their reli-
gion: surprisingly,  for the ECtHR’s judges, Dahlab’s veil had ‘proselytising effects’, 
while Kokkinakis’ speech not. In other words, Dahlab’s illocutionary act (or perfor-
mance) represented a greater threat to liberty than Kokkinakis’s attempt to proselytize in 
a country where it is illegal10. 
The clash between women’s performative body and the logocentrism on which 
Western polity and law is based is clear also in the Sahin case, in which a young univer-
sity student at Istanbul University was denied access to a written examination because 
veiled, following a circular released by the university prohibiting students from wearing 
the headscarf. As no university in the country allowed the wearing of the veil, Sahin 
was forced to move to Vienna University in order to complete her studies. She applied 
first to the Istanbul Administrative Court, which dismissed her application, claiming her 
right to wear the hijab in the university. Then in 1998 she lodged a complaint against 
the Turkish government, claiming that the ban on wearing the headscarf in higher edu-
cation violated her rights under Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 2 of Protocol No. 111. The case reached the Strasbourg Court 
and in 2005 the Grand Chamber decided that the university’s refusal to allow her to 
wear a headscarf did not violate Article 9 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. The ECtHR’s decision was based on the assumption that the values of Sharia 
law, symbolized in the veil worn by the claimant, are illiberal and incompatible with 
                                                                
10 See Article 13. 2 of the Constitution of Greece ( 2016). 
11 Supra 
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Western/liberal/secular democratic principles of gender equality. In the case, the Court 
felt the need to retell the master narrative of the rise of the secular state in Turkey and it 
appeared that the problem was the existence of religious extremist groups that were 
threatening the secular Turkish Republic. For this reason, based on the ECtHR’s reason-
ing, the measures adopted by the university were in line with the Convention. It is not 
clear, however, whether there were extremist Islamist groups operating in the universi-
ty; how these groups affected public order; and if the applicant had a relationship with 
those groups. None of these points were answered by the Court. Rather, it seemed that 
the general approach of the Court sets forth a general rule for Turkey, which implies 
that, because in the country the majority of the population is Muslim, it is essential to 
ban the veil in order to protect the freedom of others, the public order, and the principle 
of secularism and gender equality12. However, by focusing on the history of Turkey and 
the (supposed) existence of extremist religious movements which attempt to overthrow 
the secular state, the Court made a mistake: it «substituted Turkey for the University of 
Istanbul and Islam for the headscarf» (Altiparmak and Karahanogullari 2006, 279). 
In both cases, (Muslim) women’s body performances have been intended as expres-
sion, symbol and ‘sign’ of’ something intrinsically ‘other’ from which society must be 
protected. In fact, as I have argued, article 9 of the Convention, at the center of the EC-
tHR judges’ decisions in the analyzed cases, can be limited only if it is necessary in a 
democratic society; in the interests of public safety; for the protection of public order, 
health or morals; or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Hence, by 
applying the principle of necessity to justify banning the veil, the ECtHR’s judges de-
termined that the harm caused by a veiled woman to society is of more importance than 
the harm caused by the law to many veiled Muslim women in the name of women’s 
rights: as a result, Dahlab lost her job because her veil, understood as a “symbol of” 
gender inequality and un-liberal values, was considered a threat to ‘vulnerable children’, 
while Sahin was obliged to move to another country because her veil was seen as a 
“sign of” Islamist proliferation and so a threat to Turkey’s secular values. All in all, it 
seems that the debate over the practice of veiling has become the terrain upon which 
                                                                
12 It is worth noting the dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens, who pointed out that what was missing in 
the debate was the opinion of women. 
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concepts of secularism, individual autonomy and gender equality are discursively con-
structed. 
While many Western/liberal scholars have studied Muslim women’s freedom and 
their possibility of agency in terms of the moral autonomy of the subject resisting exter-
nal (patriarchal) structures of power (Ahmed 1992), Mahmood’s study moves «beyond 
the teleology of emancipation underwriting many accounts of women’s agency» 
(Mahmood 2001, 210) by reconsidering «the conceptual relationship between desire and 
self-making, performance and the constitution of the subject, and moral action and em-
bodiment in feminist debates» (Ivi, 203). She intends agency «not simply [as] a syno-
nym for resistance to social norms but… [as] a modality for action that historically spe-
cific relations of subordination enable and create»13 (Mahmood 2011, 157). She argues 
that «it is through repeated bodily acts that one trains one’s memory, desire, and intel-
lect to behave according to established standards of conduct» (Ivi, 23). In essence, it is 
one’s performative practice that determines one’s desires and not the opposite: women 
of the piety movement’s repeated bodily acts become indispensable for the self to ac-
quire specific values considered a necessary attribute of the self. For instance, despite a 
wider consensus among Muslims about the importance of the Islamic virtue of ‘modes-
ty’, there is no consensus on how this virtue should be lived, performed, and/or experi-
enced and whether it requires the donning of the veil. For most pietist women, the veil 
not only expresses the value of modesty, but it is also the means through which this val-
ue is acquired. Interestingly, they draw a link between the norm (modesty) and the form 
this norm takes (wearing the veil). In this way the bodily act of wearing the veil be-
comes a necessary means to express and, at the same time, to acquire the virtue of mod-
esty (Ibidem). Thus, the body emerges as a “medium for, not a sign of”. 
It is worth noting, however, that different kinds of subjectivity and selfhood inhabit 
the same historical and cultural space, whereas each of those configurations of person-
hood is the product of different discourses. In fact, pietist women have a completely dif-
ferent understanding of ritual obligations and the role of the body in forming the “mor-
                                                                
13 Foucault’s analysis (1981) of ethical formation helps to understand agency firstly as a capacity required 
to take specific moral action and, secondly, as bounded to cultural and historical discourses through 
which the subject is formed. 
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al-subject”. These differences within an (apparently) united movement help us to under-
stand how different discourses can form different subjectivities and that those plural 
subjectivities often escape from the liberal logic of freedom and agency of the (homo-
geneous) fixed and monolithic Christian/secular/liberal subject of law. This plurality of 
normative choices is embedded in the very structure of Islamic law: since in classical 
Islamic jurisprudence there does not exist a centralized authority that regulates and/or 
punishes infractions, and due to the lack of consensus over many issues, including the 
practice of veiling, juridical matters become interpretable by the individual. As Asad 
(2009) argues, the engagement of ordinary Muslims with Islamic founding texts de-
pends on the context through which those texts acquire a specific meaning14. 
The donning of the veil is a good example of the plurality of sources and discourses 
in which women maneuver their agency. If for a pietist the veil is a tool to acquire spe-
cific ethical achievements, for Bedouin women veiling is a symbol of an individual eth-
ic and honor toward their families (Abu-Lughod 2000), while the veil worn by Egyptian 
women in the mid-1970s can be read both as a mark of piety and as a “sign of” being an 
educated and sophisticated urban woman (Macleod 1991). 
 
« These discursive challenges to customary practices illustrate women’s power to 
exert some control over the conditions of their lives by redefining those practices 
and categories of meaning: women reconstruct their material realities through dis-
cursive intervention in customary practice».15  
 
Therefore, the donning of the veil should not be confused with lack of agency, but 
should be intended within particular discourses which form not only the subject but also 
its desires (Abu-Lughod 2002). This may be what is unsettling for western/liberal 
scholars: that desire is not a universal fixed category and subjectivity is a fragile and 
ambiguous concept constituted through performativity of a lived and ever-changing 
body of interpretable norms. Those norms are not only subverted or re-enacted but also 
                                                                
14 Similarly, as Rappaport (1999, 93) points out, cultural order is not static; rather, it continuously chang-
es through the performative repetition of fixed rituals by individuals who, by giving a different signifi-
cance to it, render the cultural order ‘fluent’. 
15 (Hirschmann 2009, 186). 
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lived, experienced, and inhabited. This is not to say that all Muslim women wear the 
veil to create a pious self, nor that they all intend their bodies as a tool to reach specific 
ethical achievements: even if a specific group of women wears the veil for a specific 
reason, it is impossible to generalize because the choice to veil is very personal. Since 
the practice of veiling takes different colors, shapes and forms, it also implies different 
meanings and normative choices within different social, cultural and historical contexts 
(Davary 2009). 
The attempt by liberal scholars and judges to see the practice of veiling as a fixed 
and unchangeable religious/cultural symbol, a “sign of” and not a “medium for”, does 
not take into consideration either the plurality of meanings and practices of veiling or 
the historical, social, and cultural context within which certain practices, will and de-
sires develop. Differently, Mahmood’s study discloses how women maneuver their 
agency within different frameworks of power and how specific body performances can 
be understood in non-liberal terms: agency comes from «within sematic and institution-
al networks that define and make possible particular ways of relating to people, things, 
and one self» (Asad 2003, 78). In other words, she helps to understand other forms of 
subjectification that do not necessarily fall into the neo-liberal idea of freedom as au-
tonomy and the Manichean dialectic between freedom and coercion. 
 
3. Re-conceptualizing women’s freedom: an eastern/western perspec-
tive 
 
The liberal concept of agency is strictly related to the concept of freedom intended as 
the mere possibility of the subject to choose autonomously based on her own desires. In 
liberal thought, individual autonomy defines the ‘human’ and emerges through the dis-
tinction between positive and negative freedom which has deeply informed liberal and 
feminist analyses of women’s freedom and women’s rights (Hirschmann 1997)16. Nega-
tive freedom is defined by the absence of external obstacles, while positive freedom is 
                                                                
16 From ‘natural freedom’, associated with the emergence of ‘natural rights’, to a new concept of freedom 
linked to a specific concept of humanity, as emerges in human rights law, ideas such as self-
determination, autonomous will and (abstract) ‘equality’ come to define Christian/secular/liberal culture 
and polity: the social contract, for instance, is based on a specific (individualist) Western concept of free-
dom, choice, and consent (Hirschmann 1997, 461-462; Mill 1998). 
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understood as the capacity to realize an autonomous will (Taylor 1979). Thus, in west-
ern/liberal thought, autonomy «is a procedural principle, and not an ontological or sub-
stantive feature of the subject, it delimits the necessary condition for the enactment of 
the ethics of freedom» (Mahmood 2011, 11). The difficulties in the western/liberal ap-
proach to freedom are revealed in the complexity of drawing a clear line between an 
internal self, with its own particular desires, and the external world, in which the subject 
exists: «without such specificity of context, the individual too is unspecified, an abstrac-
tion» (Hirschmann 2009, 10). 
Since the individual emerges as a mask, an abstraction, the liberal approach does not 
help to understand how will and desires are formed. If, as liberal scholars argue, we 
have conflicting internal desires, then how can we understand our true will? If, echoing 
Foucault (1981), the subject emerges as the product of a particular social formation and 
as such is not only ‘constrained’ but also formed by it17, then we need to interrogate the 
liberal assumption of a ‘rational-self-master’ who knows exactly what his/her true de-
sires are. 
In fact, if desires and interests come to be shaped by what the general discourse ren-
ders “available”, then «the ideal of the naturalized and unified subject utilized by most 
freedom theories is […] deeply problematic and simplistically overdrawn» (Hirschmann 
2009, 13). 
Abu-Lughod’s study of Bedouin women is an interesting example of how the con-
cept of freedom can be understood differently in non-liberal contexts. Although indi-
vidual autonomy is an important feature in Bedouin society, the concept of membership, 
obedience to sources of authority and honor, remains central. For Bedouin, honor is 
strictly linked to the status of each tribe and is associated with the capacity to «stand 
alone and fear nothing», for «fear of anyone or anything implies it has control over one» 
(Abu-Lughod 2000, 88): this is measured as both the capacity to secure authority and 
the free consent to obey. Hence, if on the one hand, the individual must be strong and 
independent, then on the other, she is entangled in tribal hierarchical structures, due the 
                                                                
17 Of particular interest is Sandel’s critique (1998) of the Western/liberal concept of the individual. 
Through an analysis of the paradoxes of Rawls’ notion of the individual as detached from all empirical 
constraints (derived from the Kantian ethic), he argues that individuals are not detached from the commu-
nity, but constituted by it. 
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link between honor, autonomy and tribal status.18 Veiling, for instance, is considered a 
source of honor and, hence, of freedom because it attests to a certain independence from 
men, as it «serves as a statement that the wearer is intent on preserving herself as sepa-
rate from others, emotionally and psychologically as well as physically; it is a tangible 
marker of separateness and independence» (Hirschmann 1997, 474)19. Abu-Lughod’s 
analysis is of particular interest because it reveals that the main difference between the 
“eastern” and the “liberal/western” idea of freedom does not lie in the importance peo-
ple give to the concept of freedom, but in a different notion of the individual. In fact, at 
the heart of eastern concepts of freedom is not the self-reliant, self-controlled, lonely 
western/liberal citizen, but an individual who is part of a community which, in turn, 
deeply influences concepts of self, freedom and agency. 
This shows how the question of women’s freedom emerges as extremely ambiguous 
in relation to specific discourses which, in turn, form specific subjectivities. For Bedou-
in women, pietists, and MacLeod’s Egyptians (1991), the veil represents an instrument 
of agency not intended as repetition/subversion of norms, but as a way for individuals to 
inhabit norms within specific discourses. Those women, unlike the Western/liberal citi-
zen detached from her/his community and alone before the state, maneuver their lives 
within a community in which other values of freedom and autonomy emerge: in other 
words, when analyzing concepts of women’s freedom and agency, it is essential to un-
derstand the local context in which certain bodily acts are performed and certain desires 
formed. 
Therefore the analysis of the practice of veiling should take into consideration «not 
just […] whether the choosing subject can act on her choice but how that subject and 
her choices are constructed in the first place» (Hirschmann 1997, 483). In this sense, the 
liberal opposition between those who defend the ‘free will’ of Muslim women and those 
who see veiling as a backward cultural imposition is a fake one. The paradox of liberal-
ism lies exactly in the formulation of choice as measurement of freedom (the more 
                                                                
18 For Bedouin women, for instance, challenging a familiar hierarchy would be considered a dishonor 
and, thereby, a mark of un-freedom (Abu-Lughod 2000). 
19 It is worth pointing out, however, that if on the one hand women maneuver their agency within struc-
tures of power, sometimes re-enacting patriarchal norms (Elster 1983; Okin 1999), then on the other, 
those norms give them the framework within which they negotiate their choices (Alvi 2013; Foucault 
1981, 1970). 
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choices I have, the more I am supposed to be free) (Hirschmann 1997). In fact, as I have 
argued, the western/liberal universalist model of «human action presupposes […] a nat-
ural disjuncture between a ‘person’s true desire’ and those that are socially prescribed 
[…] The politics that ensues from this disjuncture aim to identify moment and places 
where conventional norms impede the realization of an individual’s real desires, or at 
least obfuscate the distinction between what is truly one’s own and what is socially re-
quired» (Mahmood 2011, 149). In contrast, the studies I have taken into consideration 
hypothesize a possible separation between self-realization and autonomous will and be-
tween agency and discursive infrastructures: specifically, the liberal distinction between 
a subject’s own desires and social conventions cannot be easily presumed in Muslim 
majority societies since «socially prescribed forms of behavior constitute the conditions 
for the emergence of the self as such and are integral to its realization» (Mahmood 
2011, 149). Clearly, a study on veiling cannot be mapped from the Western/liberal bina-
ry distinction between more and fewer choices, as the way in which we experience our 
daily life is far more complicated. 
If the freedom of the Christian/secular/liberal individual is based on her ability to 
choose, then Muslim women, who choose to wear the veil as autonomous individuals, 
should be free to dress as they please. However, paradoxically, the same law that is 
founded on the concept of freedom and individual autonomy is also the one that limits 
women’s agency by normatively regulating their attire. In this sense, ECtHR’s decisions 
over the practice of veiling reveal a ‘universalized’ and ‘naturalized’ idea of women’s 
freedom, and show that the immanent and multi-layered pluralistic practice of veiling 
escapes Western eyes. Thus, what veiling unfolds is the blindness of our own practices, 
including dressing: «social constructivism [should remind] us once again of the inevita-
ble situatedness of meaning in context» (Hirschmann 2009, 174), which implies that all 
practices, including veiling, shall be understood within specific structures of power 
(Haraway 1988); in the case, the power of western/liberal discourse lies exactly in the 
homogenized representation of covering practices which allow the continuation of an 
epistemic violence against Muslim women (Husain and Ayotte 2005). By defining veil-
ing as a ‘backward’ ‘religious practice in contrast with secular/liberal values of gender 
equality’, not only do ECtHR’s judges violate women’s own understanding of their own 
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practices, but they also reduce the ‘woman question’ to a single piece of cloth which 
takes different forms, lengths, colors, and meanings in different cultural and historical 
contexts. Therefore, «to assume that the mere practice of veiling women in a number of 
Muslim countries indicates the universal oppression of women through sexual segrega-
tion not only is analytically reductive, but also proves quite useless when it comes to the 
elaboration of oppositional political strategy» (Mohanty and Russo 1991, 632). In this 
sense, ECtHR’s decisions over the practice of veiling support «western imperialism by 
re-inscribing western definitions and dichotomies onto eastern practices in a reactive 
manner» (Hirschmann 2009, 195), they fail to recognize that the veil represents a plural-
ity of norms, ethics and bodily practices, and they reduce the subject to a singular and 
fixed identity (Doniger 2004). This ‘reductionism’ is not only theoretical, but is part of 
a wider neo-colonial and paternalistic political context in which the juridical regulation 
of women’s body becomes a useful tool to control the public sphere (Husain and Ayotte 
2005) and to justify western imperialist wars as well as Islamists’ struggles: both (patri-
archal) regimes aim at legally regulating and controlling women’s attire by inscribing 
women’s bodies as monolithic symbols of cultural belonging and not as subjects of cul-
ture and history. «Arguably, in neither case do women take part in constructing the 
framework within which decisions about dress take place, but rather, are forced to re-
spond in conflicting directions to frameworks constructed by men» (Shaheed 1994, 
1003): in this sense, «the effort to unveil forcefully Muslim women who have chosen 
Islamic attire would be akin to the intolerance of those who attempt to mask them by 
imposing the veil» (Davary 2009, 158). The mandatory de-veiling operated by the Shah 
in pre-revolutionary Iran, for instance, was no less oppressive than the compulsory re-
veiling ordered by the Islamic revolutionaries in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revo-
lution (Chehabi 1993). Thus, it is not the veil that renders women free or unfree, but the 
means that patriarchy allocates to a specific article of clothing that inflicts epistemic 
gender violence. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
According to the European Convention of Human Rights, religious freedom is not lim-
ited to belief but it extends also to its manifestations and it is «one of the foundations of 
a democratic society» (Kokkinakis v. Greece, para 31); however, not every act based on 
religious belief is protected by article 9. In the ECtHR’s decisions, it is the term ‘prac-
tice’ in article 9.1 which «does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a 
religion or belief» (Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, 19)20. In fact, the manifestation 
should be one of the «normal and recognized manifestations of religion or belief» that 
«actually express the belief concerned» (Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom, 20). It is 
therefore unclear why the ECtHR’s judges could not consider the veil a ‘normal mani-
festation’ which expresses a profound religious belief (Evans 2001). 
This instance becomes clear if we assume that article 9 protects the rights of subjects 
who comply with the principle of secular liberalism and with a secular mode of experi-
encing religion.21 Those legal decisions emerge as the emblem of the intrinsic paradoxes 
and contradictions of liberalism and human rights discourse in general and of the partic-
ular violence this contradiction entails for non-western traditions of law and politics in 
particular. While, on the one hand, liberalism justifies itself by claiming a separation 
between the spiritual and the temporal, the private and the public, then on the other, the 
private life of the individual has become extremely regulated. In other words, although 
human rights law is centered upon a liberal concept of the individual, it increasingly 
aims at state control of human conduct and the individual’s physical being, the body, 
even though it calls for the protection of ‘minorities’ within a plural society (Mark van 
Hoecke 2016).22 
 In this sense, those decisions reveal not only the emergence of a specific Chris-
tian/secular/liberal subject of law, one who is free and, at the same time, compelled, but 
                                                                
20 Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom. 
21 In fact, Western/liberal/secular thought presupposes that the privatization of religion is the solution to 
cultural conflicts within a society: it defines religion as a private believe (and not as a constitutive part of 
the subject) and it assumes that people will keep it in the private sphere, leaving the public sphere as a 
space of ‘people’s consensus’ (Mahmood 2009) 
22 Here, ‘secularism’ is understood as the reconceptualization of religious practices and sensitivities in the 
public sphere (Mahmood 2009; Asad 2003). 
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they also disclose a specific notion of womanhood, where hair is visible: as Fadil (2011) 
argues, secular/liberal discourse has naturalized women’s body and has discursively 
constructed the ‘un-veiled’ body as the natural and free one. This is clear in the EC-
tHR’s decisions over the practice of veiling in which women’s desires have been natu-
ralized and defined by the appropriate authority. However, by defining the veil as a 
fixed ‘symbol of something intrinsically other’, the Court has operated a detachment of 
the subject from its ‘object’: desire, in this context, becomes something neutral to be 
defined by the state so the object of desire (the veil) can now be defined as “religious” 
or “irreligious” rather than through a socio-psychological approach. In other words, 
what is at stake in the ECtHR’s legal decisions, is the association between veiling and 
specific ‘desires’ as it is presumed that «the wearer’s act of displaying the sign […] in-
corporates the actor’s will to display it – and therefore becomes part of what the head-
scarf meant» (Asad 2006, 97). It is through the definition of veiling as a “sign of” that 
the “covered body” becomes a static symbol of cultural/religious belonging, an “ob-
ject”. 
The result of this operation is that many Muslim women in Europe have been re-
moved from the public sphere or un-unveiled to be re-veiled with the mask of the 
“western liberated woman”. The debate over the hijab and the definition of the appro-
priate garments women can wear in the public sphere highlights that in Western/liberal 
countries the “woman question” has been a useful tool to create a dichotomy between 
two dis-similar imaginaries of womanhood; the ‘constructed’ western “liberated” wom-
an, and the “imaginary” Islam-ist one. However, reducing the ‘veil’ to a reli-
gious/cultural symbol simplifies the complexity of subject formation; it betrays the rich 
history and wide meanings of the practice and «it presents the veil and its regulation as 
a problem in need of a solution rather than asking how this symbol comes to be regard-
ed as a problem» (Bomeman 2014, 216). 
In conclusion, what emerges from the ECtHR’s legal decisions over the practice of 
veiling is that the western/universal-ist/liberal concept of freedom and agency has been 
the main domain through which to read women’s oppression and their possibility of 
agency. However, by taking into consideration only the western/liberal notion of indi-
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vidual freedom, western/liberal/positive/universalist law hides other forms of humanity 
(Esmeir 2012) and other concepts of freedom and agency. 
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